**How does Chinese media react to emergencies – Evidence from Weibo**

**Key questions:**

When facing some emergencies (covid-19, HK protest), how would governments and medias’ response on Weibo change, especially on the usage of political words (i.e. minzhu or democracy)?

* Would they have a more frequent usage of certain kinds of words?
* Would their topic become more political or apolitical?
* Would they have a more negative attitude towards political norms?
* How does this pattern differ between official media, private media and government?

**Significance:**

* This would help us to understand how authoritarian China maintain authoritarian resilience, especially when facing a political or non-political challenge towards the regime.

**Structure: 5000-words**

Introduction 300

Literature Review 600

Data 300

Methods 300

Results

* Word count (towards politics and some key political words) 500
* Topic extraction 500
* Political Attitude (positive vs. negative towards key terms) 500

Cross-validation via manual coding (case study throughout the results)

Explanation: Why would this happen? 600

Conclusion and Discussion 600

**References**

* Bond, P. (2008). South Africa’s “developmental state” distraction’. Mediations, 24(1), 9-28.
* Lee, F. L. (2010). The perceptual bases of collective efficacy and protest participation: The case of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 22(3), 392-411.
* Huang, H. (2015). Propaganda as signaling. Comparative Politics, 47(4), 419-444.
* King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. E. (2017). How the Chinese government fabricates social media posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument. American political science review, 111(3), 484-501.
* Kracauer, S. (1998). The salaried masses: Duty and distraction in Weimar Germany. Verso.
* Kolstø, P., & Blakkisrud, H. (2016). The new Russian nationalism. Edinburgh University Press.
* Nip, J. Y., & Fu, K. W. (2016). Challenging official propaganda? Public opinion leaders on Sina Weibo. The China Quarterly, 225, 122-144.
* Perry, E. J. (2013). Cultural governance in contemporary China: re-orienting Party propaganda.
* Perry, E. J. (2017). Higher Education and Authoritarian Resilience: The Case of China, Past and Present. Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Paper Series.
* Rock, D. (1993). Authoritarian Argentina: The nationalist movement, its history and its impact. Univ of California Press.
* Shi, T. (2014). The cultural logic of politics in mainland China and Taiwan. Cambridge University Press.
* Shin, D. C., & Sin, T. C. (2012). Confucianism and democratization in East Asia. Cambridge University Press.
* Tong, J., & Zuo, L. (2014). Weibo communication and government legitimacy in China: a computer-assisted analysis of Weibo messages on two ‘mass incidents’. Information, Communication & Society, 17(1), 66-85.
* Weiss, J. C. (2013). Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist protest in China. International Organization, 67(1), 1-35.
* Wien, P. (2008). Iraqi Arab nationalism: Authoritarian, totalitarian and pro-fascist inclinations, 1932–1941. Routledge.
* Yang, L., & Zheng, Y. (2012). Fen qings (angry youth) in contemporary China. Journal of Contemporary China, 21(76), 637-653.
* Zhao, S. (1998). A state-led nationalism: The patriotic education campaign in post-Tiananmen China. Communist and post-communist studies, 31(3), 287-302.
* Zhang, Y., Liu, J., & Wen, J. R. (2018). Nationalism on Weibo: Towards a multifaceted understanding of Chinese nationalism. The China Quarterly, 235, 758-783.